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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to present the contribution of Community 
regional policy funds to achieving socio-economic cohesion of Italian regions 
eligible under Objective 1, as well as to discuss future development barriers and 
opportunities of these regions. The paper also provides a description of Italy’s 
adjustment to the Community policy, the funds exploited by cohesive regions 
during the 2000-2006 programming period and their efficiency in the 
elimination of regional disparities. 
1. Introduction 
Italy is a country with regions diversified in economic and civilization 
terms. The gap between the industrialized, affluent North and the poor, 
agricultural South, called Mezzogiorno1, is evident and persistent despite 
substantial financial transfers designed to boost the socio-economic development 
of this part of Italy. The funds are provided by the national budget and by the 
Community structural funds. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s the Italian cohesion policy changed 
dramatically. The policy of extraordinary interventions in the South was 
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1
 Mezzogiorno (Italian South) denotes the area comprising the following regions in the South 
of Italy: Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, Puglia, Sardinia and Sicily. 
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abandoned and the area of interventions was expanded, as they were no longer 
limited to the South but covered all problem areas in Italy. This change was 
brought about by the reform of the Community structural funds in 1988. Due to 
the inconsistence between Italian and Community policies, the objectives, 
principles, instruments and procedures were adjusted through neutralisation of 
pressure groups and activation of a coalition of participants, comprising of 
representatives of the government and regional administration. These were the 
factors which enabled the policy change. 
2. Italy’s adjustment to the Community regional policy 
Italy’s attempts to adjust the organization of Community initiatives to its 
own administration (and not vice-versa) is a unique practice among EU member 
countries (SVIMEZ 1996,p.254) Despite the huge funds obtained, Italy was the 
only country whose actions were qualified as inconsistent with Community 
policies. Analysis concerning the first (1988-1993) and the second (1994-1999) 
programming periods revealed a number of problems related to the timing and 
procedures of implementation of the operational plans, which testified to Italy’s 
little interest in international structural policy (Moffa 2005, p.139). 
In the 1980s, after La Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (Fund for the South) had 
been terminated, the Italians debated the option to abandon extraordinary 
intervention and considered how to replace the discontinued fund, which had 
been engaged in the management of public assistance addressed to the most 
impoverished regions of the South. Little attention was paid to the possibility of 
making use of Community financial instruments, while the key role was still to 
be played by special instruments, primarily including government initiatives. 
This disinterest was in opposition to the modifications in the Community 
Cohesion Policy and to a substantial increase in funding, allowing the 
Community policy to play a significant role in national programming for 
underdeveloped areas (in the South of Italy). On the one hand, it is true that the 
funds in the Community budget allocated to the regional policy remained 
disproportionately small, given the ambitions objectives, until the late 1980s, 
and the cohesion policy was mainly financed by La Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that country-level initiatives at that time 
could be supported by Community funds, and the member states tended to 
increase their budget funding to enhance regional development.  
Presumably, Italy underestimated the methodology promoted by the 
Community rather than the funds allocated to the regional policy. Otherwise, it 
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would be difficult to explain why during the reform of the cohesion policy (with 
substantially increased outlays) a member state characterized by considerable 
regional disparities should not actively participate in the European cohesion 
policy. Indeed, before the third programming period the Italian government had 
been only marginally involved in negotiations between the member states and 
the European Commission, and it owes the substantial subsidies it was granted 
to other, more negotiation-oriented member states, such as Spain. 
2.1. Underlying causes of policy inconsistence 
Analysis of the inconsistence of Italy’s policies with the European Union 
cohesion policy should consider the fact that when the member states decided to 
reform the structural funds, Italy predominantly used extraordinary interventions 
due to their simplicity.  
To understand the unique position of Italy, it is necessary to compare 
essential elements of the Italian cohesion policy pursued before and after the 
liquidation of La Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. The turning point was the reform of 
structural funds in 1988, which introduced four primary principles presented in 
Delor’s packet: concentration, additionality, programming and partnership. 
The first criterion was the principle of concentration with a key role of 
the methodology used to define underdeveloped areas over both periods (Cafiero 
2000,p.84). Prior to the reform of the structural funds, the government’s 
extraordinary interventions were based on territorial concentration and aimed to 
attain sustainable “economic and social development of southern Italy” (Article 
1 of Act No 646/1950). This priority was not, however, accompanied by any 
programme documents outlining rigorous objectives in relation to territorial 
(selection of areas) or quantitative factors (GDP, employment rates, etc.). It was 
not until 1990 when, under the influence of Delor’s reform, Italy finally 
identified the most backward regions based on standard indices. 
The first important effect of this change was the definition of objectives to 
be accomplished, measured by the degree to which the gap was bridged. For 
example, as regards areas eligible under Objective 1, with GDP per capita of 
below 75% of the Community average, the primary goal was to attain average 
Community GDP per capita. Application of specific indices for areas requiring 
support was a breakthrough in the Italian cohesion policy, which led to two 
kinds of implications.  
Firstly, the measures aimed to equalize living standards in 
underdeveloped areas ceased to be of extraordinary nature, that is, they became 
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regular interventions aimed to accomplish specific quantitative objectives. 
Secondly, the measures should be focused on underdeveloped areas or those 
affected by the problems revealed by official data from other regions 
(unemployment rates, declining production output, etc.). 
The other effect of the European policy was the extension of interventions 
to all areas meeting the criteria, including a number of regions in the north or 
centre of Italy. They faced a different set of problems, but they were also 
affected by the restructuring of the industry (Chiri, Pellegrini 1995). 
The remaining principles (additionality, programming and partnership) 
introduced innovative solutions to the programming of extraordinary 
interventions and therefore were difficult to apply. 
The principle of additionality was generally not applied in the period of 
extraordinary interventions in the Italian cohesion policy, as the available funds 
were national and managed by the government or institutions established for that 
purpose (La Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Agency for the South), and not by 
intermediary-level institutions. 
The first modification introduced by the principle of subsidiarity was 
Community supervision, as the Community’s financial participation in 
initiatives provided for control based on standard and repeatable criteria. The 
most important consequence was the development of “external bonds”, which 
contravened the national policy pursued in the 1950s. 
The principle of additionality was not appropriately implemented in Italy, 
which was the subject of a debate in the European Parliament in 1991. While 
reporting Community actions aimed at regional development in Italy, Gutierrez 
Diaz critically assessed the application of principles of the 1988 structural funds 
reform. While discussing the principle of subsidiarity, the Spanish Member of 
Parliament emphasized that: “The Community may not be indifferent to the 
utilization of funds in the member states, as it may happen, and it did actually 
happen in Italy, that the amount to be financed by jointly by the government and 
the regions, was almost entirely shifted to the disadvantage of the latter, which is 
inconsistent with the principle of solidarity” (Moffa 2005,p.145). Actually, 
during the first programming period (1989-1993), the Italian government 
deceitfully avoided the provision of co-financing. In that period the Community 
planned to support initiatives in Mezzogiorno amounting to Ecu 16 billion, half 
of which was supposed to be contributed by the Community budget and the rest 
by the country’s public (40%) and private sectors (10%). As regards the public 
sector, nearly 22% of funds were supposed to be contributed by the government, 
while the regional share was 19%. 
Taking advantage of its privileged position in relationships with 
community partners and its power to control financial flows, the Italian 
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government was able to reduce its share to as little as 4.1%, while the rest was 
covered by the regions. This led to significant consequences, as in a great 
number of cases the regions were not able to raise sufficient funds and the 
European Commission was forced to stop its share of financing. Thus, placing 
an added financial burden on the regional budgets, the Italian government 
blocked the possibility to obtain the funds that had been officially granted. 
A number of Italian authors go as far as to assert that the principle was not 
at all applied. During the public finance crises and poor political interest in the 
situation of the less developed regions, European funds nearly entirely 
substituted government expenditures. Actually in the South of Italy critical 
infrastructure investments including electrification, gasification, the road and 
telecommunication network were not financed under ordinary (like in the North) 
but extraordinary interventions, which, in turn, were gradually integrated with 
Community funds (Viesti 2001). 
The principle of programming constitutes the basis of the Community 
cohesion policy and was also provided for in the Italian legal system (Act no 
717/1965), but did not apply to extraordinary interventions (Cafiero 1996, pp. 
188 – 192). Actually, the national support policy was considerably dispersed and 
frequently incoherent (Cafiero 2000,p.80). Many authors emphasize that in its 
last stage of operation La Cassa per il Mezzogiorno employed a logic whereby 
public investments were used as instruments of demand rather than supply. Such 
an expenditure pattern resulted in a great number of projects that were 
unfinished, useless or used only for political purposes (Trigilia 1992).  
The Community programming introduced in the late 1980s met with  
a specific context in Italy, as the Italian government did not implement any 
global programming that would determine priorities and directions for economic 
governance (Di Palma 1996). Moreover, the programming enforced verification 
and monitoring procedures, which were unknown in the period of extraordinary 
interventions. 
A number of studies prove that procedures of concentration and co-
deciding by different institutional levels or different instances of the same level 
were foreign to the Italian administration, also with respect to the last principle 
under analysis. Actually, the principle of vertical partnership (introduced 
along with the reform of 1988) and horizontal partnership (introduced in 
1993) was brought to a national and sub-national environment that was not 
accustomed to such practices, as in Italy planning for regional development was 
within the competence of the Ministry for the South (Ministero per il 
Mezzogiorno). The Ministry determined directions of action and had exclusive 
competence with respect to working with Community institutions, while the 
regions, deprived of organizational and operational capacity, were unable to 
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prepare expert opinions concerning their development requirements and 
priorities. 
Despite the introduction of the above principle, initially the regions’ role 
in planning was marginal, as they did not have sufficient experience in 
Community programmes management, which required constant coordination 
between the Commission, the state, the regions and local units or between 
various offices and departments of the same institution. Moreover, it was 
observed that in the phases of planning and implementation of operational 
programmes and plans (national and regional), business and social organizations 
rarely cooperated, which was against Community recommendations. Empirical 
studies reveal that only entrepreneur organizations, trade unions and some 
associations participated in consultations, but never in a concerted manner to 
utilize available funds. 
Generally, during the first programming periods the low institutional 
efficiency of the Italian public administration, particularly in the South, 
persisted, which translated into poor performance in the European cohesion 
policy and the “Italization” of the Community principles. 
2.2. Italian institutions and Community programming  
Practice proves that the public administration responsible for Community 
programming issues undertakes tasks crucial for the efficient implementation of 
programming. An excessive dispersion of government institutions engaged in 
structural funds management largely contributed to the weakness of the Italian 
policy manifested by the inability to effectively develop programme priorities 
and objectives for spending funds. 
Initially, the institutions designated to implement Community policies 
were the various ministries responsible for investment sectors (Ministry of 
Agriculture, Ministry of the Budget, Ministry of Industry), while the Department 
for Community Policies (il Dipartimento per le Politiche comunitarie) was 
established as late as in 1987. Its responsibilities encompassed legal tasks, 
orientation and promotion of initiatives as well as verification of actions aimed 
to implement community policies. The management of national community 
funds and the formulation of the Community cohesion policy came within the 
competence of the Ministry of the Budget, subsequently supported by the 
Regional Policy Observatory (L’Osservatorio per le politiche regionali) and 
then by the National Central Office (Cabina di regia nazionale).  
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The Observatory, established as an instrument for monitoring the course 
and efficiency of interventions in the less developed areas and Community 
policies, operated only for a short time. Two years after it had been established, 
it was replaced by the National Central Office, whose tasks included the 
coordination of different entities responsible for programming and management 
of Community interventions and public (national and Community) resources 
allocated to the development of the less developed areas. This institution, 
however, played a marginal role as it faded into insignificance soon after its 
statute had been formulated and the Department for Development and Cohesion 
Policies (Il Dipartimento per le politiche di sviluppo e coesione, Dps) took over 
its functions. These sweeping organization changes resulted in disorganized 
cohesion policy. 
It was not until 1995 when coordination in the formulation of the cohesion 
policy became homogenous in terms of organization, following the 
establishment of a unit for cohesion policy (Servizio per le politiche di coesione) 
within the Ministry of the Budget. This development proved to be functional and 
accelerated the implementation of the 1994-1999 Community Support 
Framework. The role adopted by the Dps turned out to be crucial for the 
Europeanization of the cohesion policy, as this institution performed a central 
function in defining the intermediate and final objectives of programming and 
the modes of cooperation between regional and national institutions (Graziano 
2004, pp. 88 – 94). 
3. Cohesion Policy in the 2000-2006 programming period  
This programming period was marked by considerable changes in the 
cohesion policy, which strengthened the position of particular regions and of the 
Committee of the Regions. The adoption of the new Community Support 
Framework for the years 2000-2006 initiated the constant process of financial 
management regionalization, as the regions were granted over 70% of the funds 
available, which is 20 percentage points more than in the previous periods. 
As compared to 1998, the Italian policy was modified, which involved 
institutional changes (establishment of the Department for Development and 
Cohesion Policy), increased decentralization of funds and programming 
competence to the advantage of the regions, long-term programming, interest in 
enhanced quality of public investments and their evaluation, reform of public 
administration along with the redefinition of new institutional cooperation rules.  
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Generally, direct regional management of a large portion of the funds was 
the most innovative but also problematic aspect as regards the 2000-2006 
programming period, because the regions were granted considerable powers in 
terms of the regional policy. 
In the 2000-2006 programming period, EUR 28.8 billion were allocated to 
Italy from Community funds, at 2004 prices. Together with the national funds 
designated for co-financing projects, the total funds available amounted to EUR 
63.3 billion, of which 45.9 billion were designed for Objective 1 regions. 
Community funds were to be spent until the end of 2008, but due to the financial 
crisis that period was prolonged until 30 June 2009. 
The data obtained from the Ragioneria dello Stato monitoring revealed 
that until the end of 2008 more funds were contracted than initially programmed. 
As regards expenditures under Objective 1, EUR 55 billion were contracted at 
the end of February, which accounted for 120% of the funds granted, and 
effective spending was as high as 93.6%. As regards national operational 
programmes (PON), the average volume of liabilities and expenditures was 
117% and 98.2% respectively. As regards regional operational programmes 
(POR) this value amounted to 92.3%, but in Campania only to 86.8% (SVIMEZ 
2009, p.15). 
In the 2000-2006 programming period so-called boundary projects 
(progetti sponda) were frequently implemented in Italy. Originally, they were 
financed from different funds and then included in Community programming 
projects due to their cohesion. This was the effect of strict time guidelines 
imposed by the Community to implement projects and the government was 
concerned the that implementation of a number of projects might fail. In late 
2008 the share of such projects was nearly 44.5% in the funds spent under 
Objective 1(SVIMEZ 2009, p.13). 
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Table 1. Utilization of Community funds under Objective 1 by the priority axes as of 
31.08.2009 (EUR) 
Priority axis Total 
contribution 
2000 – 2006 A 
Funds 
contracted 
B 
Payments 
effected 
C 
B/A 
% 
C/A 
% 
Natural resources 7 658 273 320 10 270 959 589 8 217 051 208 134.1 107.3 
Cultural resources 2 516 942 608 2 887 570 629 2 448 777 323 114.7 97.3 
Human resources 8 284 924 451 9 565 982 556 8 263 254 076 115.5 99.7 
Local 
development 
systems 
14 742 174 130 18 663 929 860 14 995 295 740 126.6 101.7 
Towns 2 040 500 957 3 012 345 928 2 166 021 909 147.6 106.2 
Service networks 
and hubs 
9 775 078 228 12 002 536 867 10 737 371 484 122.8 109.8 
Technical 
assistance 
883 139 495 898 596 784 868 269 410 101.8 98.3 
TOTAL 45 901 033 190 57 301 922 212 47 696 041 150 124.8 103.9 
Source: Ministero dell`Economia e delle Finanze, 2009, p. 11. 
Table 1 reveals that the most substantial resources were allocated to 
implementing measures under Axis 4: Local Development Systems (Sistemi 
locali di sviluppo) and Axis 6: Service Networks and Hubs. The measures under 
Axis 4 encompassed local development programmes aimed to promote local 
development including support for local production systems, enhancement of 
competitiveness, improvement of product quality, innovativeness and support 
for exports. 
The objective of the measures under Axis 6: Service Networks and Hubs 
(Reti e nodi di servizio) encompassed the enhancement of competitive conditions 
for business development and the location of new initiatives to boost the 
competitiveness and efficiency of territorial economic systems. This was to be 
attained through actions improving the effectiveness of interventions and 
ensuring positive external effects, as well as through promotion of the 
sustainable development of the transport networks, ensuring the required level of 
national and international telecommunication networks, the participation of 
citizens and businesses in new economic, political and cultural processes 
favourable to their development, and restoration of social trust. Under this Axis, 
activities were undertaken in three sectors: transport, information and 
communications technology (information society), and safety. 
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The most efficient utilization of funds was observed under Axis 6 and  
1 (natural resources) and 5 (towns). As regards the remaining three axes 
(cultural resources, human resources and technical assistance), the available 
funds were not fully utilized. 
Table 2. Utilization of Community funds under Objective 1, by fund, as of 31.08.2009 (EUR) 
Fund Total 
contribution 
2000 – 2006 
A 
Funds 
contracted 
B 
Payments 
effected 
C 
B/A C/A 
ERDF 32 934 841 958 42 456 542 201 34 515 083 122 128.90% 104.80% 
ESF 6 717 807 093 7 644 319 169 6 667 924 111 113.80% 99.30% 
FGF 710 358 361 718 290 893 651 513 275 101.10% 91.70% 
EAGGF 5 538 025 778 6 482 769 949 5 861 520 643 117.10% 105.80% 
TOTAL 45 901 033 190 57 301 922 212 47 696 041 151 124.80% 103.90% 
Source: Ministero dell`Economia e delle Finanze, 2009, p. 11. 
Table 2 demonstrates that in the 2000-2006 programming period, the 
European Regional Development Fund (72.4%) provided the largest allocations 
for the attainment of Objective 1, while assistance provided by the European 
Social Fund (14%) and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(12.3%) was less substantial. The resources allocated by the Fisheries Guidance 
Fund were of marginal importance (1.3%). 
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Table 3. Utilization of Community funds under Objective 1 by the operational programmes 
as of 31.08.2009 
Operational 
programme 
Total 
contribution 
A 
Funds 
contracted 
B 
Payments 
effected 
C 
B/A 
% 
C/A 
% 
NOP Research 2 267 330 812 2 648 281.555 2 290 805 112 116.8 101.0 
NOP Safety 1 225 836 571 1 225 692 953 1 215044455 100.0 99.1 
NOP Technical 
assistance and 
system actions 
517 101 147 514 571 832 504 519 032 99.5 97.6 
NOP Development 4 452 842 857 6 429 719 955 4 852 916 848 144.4 109.0 
NOP Fisheries 277 383 357 247 657 164 233 380 541 89.3 84.1 
NOP School for 
Development 830 014 571 898 033 649 819 267 984 108.2 98.7 
NOP Transport 4 520 161 290 5 302 202 380 5 008 036 338 117.3 110.8 
NOP Total 14 090 670 605 17 266 159 488 14 923 970 310 122.5 105.9 
ROP Apulia 5 222 991 220 7 293 025 923 5 827 786 923 139.6 111.6 
ROP Basilicata 1 696 070 000 2 132 594 889 1 780 154 766 125.7 105.0 
ROP Calabria 4 034 497 392 5 144 952 184 4 094 553 753 127.5 101.5 
ROP Campania 7 748 172 780 9 792 568 333 7 820 002 006 126.4 100.9 
ROP Molise 467 997 190 552 085 599 477 705 735 118.0 102.1 
ROP Sardinia 4 180 724 685 4 928 422 641 4 352 174 141 117.9 104.1 
ROP Sicily 8 459 909 318 10 192 113 156 8 419 693 517 120.5 99.5 
ROP Total 31 810 362 585 40 035 762 724 32 772 070 841 125.9 103.0 
Objective 1 Total 45 901 033 190 57 301 922 212 47 696 041 151 124.8 103.9 
Source: Ministero dell`Economia e delle Finanze, 2009, p. 11. 
The above data reveal that in the 2000-2006 programming period the two 
most important national operational programmes, Development and Transport, 
represented the highest rates of funds utilization, as they accounted for two 
thirds of total expenditures of the national programmes. On the other hand, the 
allocations granted under the national Operational Programme Fisheries were 
not used in full. As regards regional operational programmes, practically all 
regions spent the funds allocated to them or even more (except Sicily). Apulia 
and Basilicata were the most efficient. 
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4. The effects of the cohesion policy in Italy in the years 2000-2006 
Analysis of data concerning the seven Italian Objective 1 regions 
demonstrates that over that period GDP per capita (being the most significant 
indicator) increased merely by 1.2% annually, which means that it was 
considerably lower than assumed (3.9%), and even fell below the EU-15 average 
(2%). Therefore, one could argue that despite the allocation of over EUR 48 
billion, convergence has not been achieved in this area. 
The results are even more disappointing given that Community funds 
accounted for nearly 3% of GDP in this part of Italy, which should theoretically 
considerably accelerate economic development. 
Similarly, convergence was not observed in the labour market. The 
employment rate in the South (45.9% in 2005) was among the lowest in the 
European Union, including new member states. This rate was by 20 percentage 
points short of employment rate in other parts of Italy, and 25 percentage points 
short of the guidelines stipulated by the European Union in the Lisbon Strategy. 
In the 2000-2006 programming period, the gap between the South and 
other Italian regions continued to widen. Although due to the liberalization of 
the labour market the employment rate in the South increased by nearly  
3 percentage points, the increase in northern and central parts was as much as  
6 percentage points.  
Moreover, the employability rate decreased in absolute terms, which 
meant an increased number of persons who gave up looking for a job. The 
expectations that Community funds would reverse this disadvantageous trend 
did not come true.  
Table 4. Employment rates in 1999 and 2006 
Area 1999 2006 
Mezzogiorno (Objective 1 regions) 43.0 45.9 
Centre-North 59.4 65.0 
EU 15 62.2 65.1 
Lisbon Strategy Objective  70.0 
Source: EU Structural Funds and Economic Development of Southern Italy, Vision & Value, London School 
of Economics, October 2007. 
The above data lead to the conclusion that the structural programmes in 
southern Italy did not bring about the expected results. This concerns in 
particular Calabria, Campania, Apulia and Sicily, the regions with the largest 
population and economic potential (in terms of generated GDP) in the South.  
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What is noteworthy, as regards Objective 1 regions, those that despite 
making expenditures remain below 75% of the Community average were 
granted a bonus in the form of European Union support for the next 7 years, 
which was actually awarded to four large regions in southern Italy. Given the 
facts below, this paradox seems even more dramatic. 
1/ The threshold of 75% of the Community average considerably dropped 
when new members joined the European Union, but the four Italian regions 
retained their status of underdeveloped areas. 
2/ The problem of the 2000-2006 programming period is not the first 
failure as regards these regions. In Europe, they are a unique example of regions 
that remain underdeveloped despite huge public investments of public funds. 
3/ Research suggests that public expenditure and structural funds may 
largely be embezzled and captured by organized crime. 
5. Possibilities of development 
A great number of studies on Mezzogiorno development opportunities 
report several factors which could contribute to larger convergence. They 
primarily include development of tourism, increased research expenditures, 
attraction of foreign investment and organized crime prevention. 
Tourism – about two thirds of the coastal line and nearly 50% of Italian 
cultural heritage (Italy can boast the largest number of historic buildings on the 
UNESCO list) are located in the southern regions. This fact predestines these 
regions to become European leaders in tourism. 
In the programming period, the opportunity to develop tourism was not 
used. The number of tourists per capita increased from 2.9 in 1999 to 3.3 in 
2005, but it is still less than half of that recorded in northern and central Italy. In 
2004, the South attracted 20.6% of Italian tourist traffic, 25% of domestic 
tourism and 14.2% of foreign tourism flows (SVIMEZ 2005, p. 453). 
40                                                            Lewandowski Krzysztof 
Table 5. Tourists per head 
 
Source: Vision & Value. LSE, p. 7. 
Although climate conditions in the South ensure tourist activities 
throughout the year, 70% of visits are reported between June and September. 
Moreover, despite impressive natural and cultural resources, the region is 
perceived only as a holiday area, while business and conference tourism is 
practically non-existent. This may be caused by the insufficient transport and 
service infrastructure, including the small number of flight connections with 
European cities, the underdeveloped public transport and railway network (e.g. 
there are no electrified railways in Sardinia) and the underdeveloped motorway 
network (SVIMEZ 2009, p. 7). 
Research and development – attempts to improve the share of R&D 
outlays in GDP failed in the programming period under analysis. In 2005, it was 
0.77 for Objective 1 regions, below the average for Italy (1.1%) and 
considerably smaller than the value assumed for Italian Objective 1 regions 
(1.25% for 2006) or the objectives stipulated in the Lisbon Strategy (3% for 
2010). 
Interestingly, public outlays on R&D were more substantial in the South 
(0.55% of GDP) than in the North (0.51%). On the other hand, three of seven 
Objective 1 regions did not record any private R&D investments, and only in 
Campania business R&D expenditures exceeded 0.2% of GDP. This means that 
in the South, public R&D expenditures turned out to be inefficient subsidies.  
Foreign direct investments – Objective 1 regions also falter in terms of 
attracting foreign direct investments. Although they are inhabited by over 30% 
of the Italian population, only 3.5% of foreign investments in Italy are located 
there, despite the factors which could potentially attract investors: substantial 
available labour force (including skilled labour), a large market, lower labour 
Region 1999 2005 
Apulia 1.9 2.7 
Basilicata 2.0 3.3 
Calabria 3.1 3.9 
Campania 3.4 3.3 
Molise 1.7 2.3 
Sardinia 5.6 6.2 
Sicily 2.4 2.7 
Objective 1 regions 2.9 3.3 
Centre – North 6.8 7.5 
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costs compared to other regions or the possibility of participation in community 
programmes designed for Objective 1 regions. 
This situation hardly changed in the programming period 2000-2006. 
Foreign investments were primarily located in northern Italy. While Lombardy 
absorbed 69% and Piemont 13% of foreign direct investments, southern regions 
absorbed as little as 1%. In the years 2000-2005, foreign direct investments 
accounted for 1.6% of GDP in north-western regions, 0.6% in central regions 
and 0.1% in the South. 
Table 6. Direct foreign investments in selected Italian regions (in EUR thousands) 
Region FDI inflows in 2006 Share in total national 
Apulia 247269 0.2 
Basilicata 246100 0.2 
Calabria 29963 0.0 
Campania 245991 0.2 
Sardinia 97674 0.1 
Sicily 30135 0.0 
Lombardy 104464729 68.9 
Centre-South 152124329 99.3 
Mezzogiorno 1016606 0.7 
Italy 153140935 100 
Source: Own work based on: Daniele, Marani 2008, p. 193. 
Table 6 reveals a gap between northern and southern regions with respect 
to foreign direct investment inflows. These investments could considerably 
accelerate the development of Objective 1 regions, but so far foreign investors 
have shows little interest in the South. Their presence in those regions is not 
much better, as only 371 of 7100 foreign enterprises operating in Italy (5%) have 
their registered offices in the South. 
Crime 
Many economic, sociological and historical studies claim that organized 
crime is a substantial barrier to the development of the South (Catanzaro 1991, 
Centorino, La Spina, Signorino 1999, Fiorentini, Peltzman 1995). This is also 
often thought to be the underlying cause of the small interest of national and 
foreign investors in Objective 1 regions. In 1985, Sylos Labini, the renowned 
Italian economist, reported that money extortions result in moving production to 
other regions and discourage investment in the South (Sylos Labini 1985). 
Crime organizations influence the economy in various ways. Money extortions 
from entrepreneurs are the most visible example. The funds raised are used to 
finance other crime activities and control legal businesses. Moreover, crime 
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organizations force entrepreneurs to purchase goods or raw materials from 
specific suppliers, employ members of the crime world, or impose restrictions 
on sales. 
In general terms, organized crime increases investment risk and costs, and 
consequently has a depressive effect on the whole economy. Apart from 
extortions and protection money, the protection provided by crime organizations 
leads to a situation where inefficient businesses are operated as a cover for 
illegal activity (Becchi, Rey 1994). By violence or corruption, crime 
organizations influence the functioning of the market and the institutional 
system through distorted allocation of resources and capturing of a portion of 
public funds, including Community funds. This undermines the functional 
capacity of the market and institutions, as well as the capacity for development 
of the local economy (Centorrino, Signorino 1993). 
In the 2000-2006 programming period, the crime rate in Objective  
1 regions remained high. Its measurement involved different categories of crime 
but primarily extortions, assassinations, arsons and participation in crime groups. 
Table 7. Crimes reported in 2002-2005 in selected Italian regions per population; Indices 
(Italy=100) 
Region Extortions Organized 
crime groups 
Assassinations Arsons 
Apulia 150 119 200 146 
Basilicata 87 222 29 94 
Calabria 185 196 717 346 
Campania 162 155 99 107 
Sardinia 74 36 429 149 
Sicily 143 177 186 166 
Centre-North 76 74 34 71 
Mezzogiorno 144 147 220 153 
Source: Own work based on V. Daniele, U. Marini, 2008, p. 202. 
Table 7 shows that in regions under Objective 1 the number of crimes 
analyzed is relatively larger compared to other regions but represents 
considerable diversity. The crime indices are extremely high in Campania, 
Sicily, Apulia and in particular in Calabria. 
According to estimates, nearly 160 000 of entrepreneurs in Italy faced 
extortions, predominantly in the South. The number of entrepreneurs paying 
“protection money” is estimated at 70% in Sicily, 50% in Calabria, 40% in 
Campania and 40% in Apulia, which means that over 120 000 entrepreneurs are 
faced with this practice. If the protection money is not paid, crime organizations 
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strike by intimidation, property damage or even attempts on entrepreneurs’ lives 
(Daniele, Marini 2008, p. 203). 
Although organized crime changes over time and its expansion into the 
centre and north of Italy is under way, regional differences are still observed. 
The majority of Objective 1 regions are affected by crime to a substantial 
degree, which constitutes a peculiar type of comparative cost that may have  
a far-reaching, negative effect on the development of these areas. 
6. Conclusions 
Italy provides an interesting example of cohesion policy implementation. 
Despite its long tradition in conducting policies aimed at eliminating regional 
disparities (dating back to the 1950s) and huge expenditures, Italy’s performance 
has been very poor. 
In the 2000-2006 programming period, considerable progress in Italy’s 
adjustment to the Community cohesion policy was observed and satisfactory 
results in the exploitation of EU funds were achieved. However, these actions 
did not translate into improved performance of the poorest Italian regions, which 
is an extremely unusual situation that has never occurred anywhere else in the 
European Union.  
The underlying causes of the failure are complex. The analysis offered in 
this paper reveals poor results in acquiring direct foreign investments and 
developing tourism and modern technologies, which are prerequisites for 
economic success in many regions. Organized crime has also considerably 
hindered development and is largely responsible for deterring investment 
activities in the south of Italy. 
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Streszczenie 
 
REALIZACJA WSPÓLNOTOWEJ POLITYKI SPÓJNOŚCI WE WŁOSZECH  
I JEJ ZNACZENIE W WYRÓWNYWANIU DYSPROPORCJI REGIONALNYCH 
 
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie znaczenia, jakie środki wspólnotowej polityki 
regionalnej odegrały w osiąganiu spójności społeczno – gospodarczej przez włoskie 
regiony Celu 1 oraz pokazanie barier i szans rozwojowych dla tych terytoriów  
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w przyszłości. W części pierwszej przedstawiony został proces dostosowawczy Włoch do 
polityki wspólnotowej, głównie pod względem zgodności prowadzonej polityki  
z zasadami polityki regionalnej oraz dostosowań instytucjonalnych. W części drugiej 
przedstawiona została analiza porównawcza wielkości funduszy wykorzystanych przez 
regiony kohezyjne w okresie programowania 2000 – 2006 z założonymi wielkościami, 
 a także próba odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy środki te w istotnej mierze wpłynęły na 
zmniejszenie się różnic miedzy biedniejszymi regionami Południa a bogatszymi Północy 
– Centrum. W ostatniej części pokazano możliwości i bariery rozwojowe, przed którymi 
stoją włoskie regiony kohezyjne. 
